Technology Choice, Financial Sector and Economic Integration under the Presence of Efficiency Wages by Wen, Lei & Zhou, Haiwen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Technology Choice, Financial Sector and
Economic Integration under the Presence
of Efficiency Wages
Lei Wen and Haiwen Zhou
10 May 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93835/
MPRA Paper No. 93835, posted 13 May 2019 15:36 UTC
1 
 
Technology Choice, Financial Sector and Economic 
Integration under the Presence of Efficiency Wages 
 
Lei Wen & Haiwen Zhou 
 
Abstract 
Impact of economic integration on unemployment is studied in a general equilibrium model 
in which unemployment is a result of the existence of efficiency wages. Banks provide capital to 
manufacturing firms and engage in oligopolistic competition. Manufacturing firms choose 
technologies and also engage in oligopolistic competition. A country with a more efficient 
financial sector has a lower unemployment rate and a comparative advantage in producing 
manufactured goods. Trade integration decreases the unemployment rate and increases the wage 
rate and the equilibrium level of technology. An additional financial integration will decrease the 
unemployment rate and increase the wage rate and the level of technology further. 
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1. Introduction 
With increasing returns in production, economic integration should be beneficial to 
participating countries. Actually, there is no country in the world that is both rich and closed. While 
in general economic integration is beneficial to countries, countries still have various concerns 
about the impact of economic integration, such as its impact on a country’s levels of unemployment 
and technology. First, unemployment is an economically and politically important issue. How will 
trade liberalization affect a country’s unemployment rate (Davidson and Matusz, 2010)? Second, 
international division of labor may be hierarchical, and countries want to specialize in industries 
with great technological potentials. How will economic integration affect a country’s choice of 
technologies and productivity? While there is no consensus, many empirical studies have 
demonstrated that trade openness and financial openness increase productivity (Wu, 2000; Alcala 
and Ciccone, 2004; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2011). Empirical research such as Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2011) also reveals the importance of the quality of financial institutions in 
affecting a country’s gain from openness. 
In this paper, we study the impact of trade and financial integration on unemployment in a 
general equilibrium model. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. There are two 
sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. Unemployment is the result of the existence of efficiency 
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wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Banks provide capital to manufacturing firms. As a two-tier 
oligopoly model, banks engage in oligopolistic competition (Williamson, 1986; Jungblut, 2004), 
manufacturing firms also engage in oligopolistic competition (Neary, 2003, 2016; Zhang, 2007; 
Andrzej and Ryan, 2012) and choose production technologies to maximize profits.  
We show that a country with a more efficient financial sector chooses a more advanced 
technology, has a lower unemployment rate and a comparative advantage in producing 
manufactured goods. Trade integration leads to equalization of unemployment rate in the two 
countries even though they may differ in the level of efficiency in the financial sector and factor 
endowments. Trade integration increases social welfare in both countries because it decreases the 
unemployment rate and increases the wage rate. After trade integration, an additional financial 
integration between the two countries will increase the wage rate and reduce unemployment rate 
in both countries further.  
For studies on financial integration, Lane (2013) discusses the relationship between 
financial globalization and financial crisis. In Beck (2002), financial friction is captured by an 
iceberg type search cost and a country with a higher search cost will export food. Ju and Wei 
(2011) study a model that there are agency costs of using external finance. With low agency costs, 
factor endowments determine a country’s comparative advantage. With high agency costs, agency 
costs in the financial sector determine a country’s comparative advantage. One significant 
difference between this paper and Beck (2002) and Ju and Wei (2011) is that unemployment is not 
studied in those papers. 
Depending how unemployment is incorporated, models studying the impact of opening of 
international trade on unemployment can be classified as follows. First, for models with search 
generated unemployment, Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) establish a model in which firms 
engage in perfect competition. They show that labor market efficiency is an independent source of 
a country’s comparative advantage. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) study a model with 
firm heterogeneity. They show that exporting firms are bigger and pay higher wages than other 
firms. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) show that a decrease in labor market friction in a country may 
harm its trading partner. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) show that opening of trade 
increases wage inequality and has an ambiguous impact on unemployment. Second, Matusz (1996) 
demonstrates that the opening of international trade increases the wage rate. This wage change 
affects the non-shirking constraint in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model and thus the unemployment rate. 
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Hoon (2001) examines a Ricardian model in which countries differ in technologies. Brecher and 
Chen (2010) address how international trade, migration, and outsourcing affect unemployment. 
Davis and Harrigan (2011) introduce firm heterogeneity into an efficiency wage model in which 
firms differ in their monitoring intensities of workers who may shirk. Third, Egger and 
Kreickemeier (2012) explore the impact of international trade on unemployment and income 
inequality in which unemployment results from the existence of fair wages. Fourth, Arnold and 
Trepl (2015) incorporate unemployment through union wage bargaining. Finally, Brecher, Chen, 
and Yu (2013) study the interaction between offshoring and unemployment under the presence of 
wage floor. While this paper focuses on the interaction between the financial sector, the choice of 
technology, and unemployment, the financial sector and the choice of technology are not addressed 
in the above models.  
Models above (especially the search type models) provide a detailed microfoundation for 
studying unemployment. To have a tractable model on a firm’s choice from a continuum of 
technologies, here we choose to adopt efficiency wage approach because unemployment can be 
incorporated in a simple way through the non-shirking condition (equation (7) below). Equation 
(7) establishes a negative relationship between the wage rate and the unemployment rate: the 
higher the wage rate, the lower the unemployment rate. If this negative relationship is also present 
in other types of models, then results here will be robust to alternative setups.  
For models in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition, Zhou (2010) 
addresses impact of trade integration with firm heterogeneity, Wen and Zhou (2012) examine 
financial and trade integration, and Gong and Zhou (2014) study a model of international trade in 
which manufacturing firms choose production technologies. One important difference between 
this paper and the above three papers is that unemployment is not addressed in those papers. Zhou 
(2015) visits financial and trade integration for developing countries. The wage rate is exogenous 
given in Zhou (2015) while it is endogenously determined in this paper. Zhou (2018) addresses 
the impact of international trade on unemployment in which unemployment is a result of the 
existence of efficiency wages. This paper differs from Zhou (2018) in two aspects. In this paper, 
capital is a factor of production and banks engage in oligopolistic competition. In Zhou (2018), 
there is neither capital nor financial sector. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and establishes the 
equilibrium conditions in which countries are in autarky. Section 3 studies the impact of the 
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opening of international trade on the wage rate, the level of technology, and unemployment. 
Section 4 examines the impact of financial and trade integration between the two countries. Section 
5 discusses some generalizations and extensions of the model and concludes. 
 
2. Countries in autarky 
There are two countries: home and foreign. In this section, we study the equilibrium for a 
country in autarky. Without loss of generality, we focus on the home country. First, we study a 
consumer’s utility maximization. Second, we study profit maximization of firms. Third, we 
establish market clearing conditions, such as the clearance of the market for manufactured goods. 
Finally, we conduct comparative statics to explore properties the steady state. 
There are two types of goods: the agricultural good and a continuum of manufactured 
goods. The agricultural good is produced by labor with constant returns to scale. The number of 
employed individuals in the agricultural sector is 𝐿௔. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
each employed individual in the agricultural sector produces one unit of the agricultural good. 
There is a continuum of manufactured goods indexed by a number 𝜛 ∈ [0,1].1 All manufactured 
goods have the same costs of production and enter a consumer’s utility function in the same way. 
Both capital and labor are used in producing each manufactured good. The amount of exogenously 
given capital is 𝐾 . Capital is assumed to be owned equally by all individuals.2 Banks attract 
deposits from individuals and supply capital to firms. Variables associated with the banking sector 
usually carry a subscript 𝑏. 
 
2.1. Individual behavior 
The size of the population is 𝐿. An individual’s level of consumption of the agricultural 
good is 𝑐௔ and that of manufactured good 𝜛 is 𝑐(𝜛). Each individual is endowed with one unit of 
labor. The cost of effort for a worker without shirking is 𝜙. The subjective discount rate of a 
consumer is ρ. For 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), a consumer’s utility function is specified as 
                                                 
1 The motivation of introducing a continuum of manufactured goods instead of one manufactured good is to eliminate 
a firm’s market power in the labor market (Neary, 2003, 2016). Even though a manufacturing firm has market power 
in product market, it does not have market power in the labor market because there is an infinite number of 
manufacturing firms demanding labor. 
2 With homothetic preferences assumed in this paper, the distribution of ownership of capital will not affect aggregate 
demand of final goods. 
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     ∫ 𝑈(𝑡)𝑒ିఘ 𝑑𝑡ஶ଴ ,    
     𝑈(𝑡) = 𝑐௔ఈ ∫ 𝑐(𝜛)ଵିఈ𝑑𝜛 − 𝑠𝜙
ଵ
଴ .          (1) 
 In the above specification, 𝑠 ∈ {0, 1}. If a worker shirks, then 𝑠 = 0; if a worker does not 
shirk, then 𝑠 = 1. The price of the agricultural good is 𝑝௔ and that of manufactured good ϖ is 
𝑝(𝜛). An individual’s expenditure is 𝐼, which is spent on the agricultural good and manufactured 
goods: 𝑝௔𝑐௔ + ∫ 𝑝(𝜛)𝑐(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = 𝐼
ଵ
଴ . For an individual, the per capita income from ownership of 
capital is η. The wage rate in the manufacturing sector is 𝑤 and the unemployment rate in the 
economy is 𝑢. If an individual is unemployed, 𝐼 = 𝜂; If an individual is employed, 𝐼 = 𝑤 + 𝜂. 
With the specification of the utility function, utility maximization leads to 𝛼 per cent of 
income spent on the agricultural good and 1 − 𝛼 per cent of income spent on manufactured goods. 
The indirect utility function can be written as 
   𝑉(𝐼, 𝑝௔, 𝑝, 𝑒) =
ఈഀ(ଵିఈ)భషഀ
௣ೌഀ௣భషഀ
𝐼 − 𝑠𝜙. 
The exogenous job separation rate is 𝑏. If a worker shirks, the probability that shirking is 
detected is 𝑞. A worker found shirking will be fired. The expected lifetime utility of an employed 
shirker is 𝑉ாௌ, that of an unemployed individual is 𝑉௨, and that of an employed nonshirker is 𝑉ாே. 
For a shirker, the instant utility is 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂). At each moment, there is a probability of 𝑏 + 𝑞 of 
becoming unemployed and thus asset value change 𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாௌ. Thus, the asset equation for a shirker 
is 
    𝜌𝑉ாௌ = 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) + (𝑏 + 𝑞)(𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாௌ).          (2) 
 For a non-shirker, the exogenous job separation rate at each moment is 𝑏. For this kind of 
worker, the instant utility is 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) − 𝜙 . At each moment, there is a probability of 𝑏  of 
becoming unemployed and thus asset value change 𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாே. Thus, the asset equation for a non-
shirker is 
    𝜌𝑉ாே = 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) − 𝜙 + 𝑏(𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாே).          (3) 
 A worker will not shirk if the expected lifetime utility for a shirker is smaller than that for 
a non-shirker: 𝑉ாே ≥ 𝑉ாௌ . From equations (2) and (3), for a worker not to shirk, the following 
condition needs to be satisfied: 
     𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) ≥ 𝜌𝑉௨ +
(ఘା௕ା௤)థ
௤
.           (4) 
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The instant rate for an unemployed individual to find employment is 𝑎. For an unemployed 
individual, the instant utility is 𝑈(𝜂). At each moment, there is a probability of 𝑎 of finding a job 
and thus a change of asset value of max (𝑉ாௌ, 𝑉ாே) − 𝑉௨. The asset equation for an unemployed 
individual is  
    𝜌𝑉௨ = 𝑈(𝜂) + 𝑎[max (𝑉ாௌ, 𝑉ாே) − 𝑉௨].          (5) 
 In equilibrium, max(𝑉ாௌ, 𝑉ாே) = 𝑉ாே. From equations (3) and (5), we have 
    𝜌𝑉௨ =
௔[௎(௪ାఎ)ିథ]ା(ఘା௕)௎(ఎ)
௔ା௕ାఘ
.            (6) 
Suppose total employment is 𝑁 . With a job separation rate of 𝑏 , the flow into the 
unemployment pool is 𝑏𝑁. With a job acquisition rate 𝑎, the flow out is 𝑎(𝐿 − 𝑁). Since time is 
continuous, the change in unemployment rate is  
?̇? = ଵ
௅
[𝑏𝑁 − 𝑎(𝐿 − 𝑁)]. 
In a steady state, there is no change in unemployment rate: ?̇? = 0. Thus, 𝑎 = 𝑏 ே
௅ିே
, or 𝑎 =
𝑏 ଵି௨
௨
. In equilibrium the non-shirking condition is held with equality. Combining equations (4) 
and (6) with 𝑎 = 𝑏 ଵି௨
௨
 yields 
    ఈ
ഀ(ଵିఈ)భషഀ
௣ೌഀ௣భషഀ
𝑤 − 𝜙 − థ
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0.           (7) 
 
2.2. Firm behavior 
Firms producing the same manufactured good engage in Cournot competition. The number 
of firms producing manufactured good 𝜛 is 𝑚(𝜛). To produce a manufactured good, there is a 
continuum of technologies indexed by a positive number 𝑛. A higher value of 𝑛 indicates a more 
advanced technology. For technology 𝑛, a firm’s fixed cost is 𝑓(𝑛) units of capital and its marginal 
cost is 𝛽(𝑛) units of labor. It is assumed that fixed costs increase while marginal cost decreases 
with the level of technology: 𝑓ᇱ(𝑛) > 0 and 𝛽ᇱ(𝑛) < 0.3 The level of output of a manufacturing 
firm is 𝑥. A bank charges an interest rate of 𝑅 for each unit of capital provided to a manufacturing 
firm. Thus, a firm’s profit is 𝑝𝑥 − 𝑓(𝑛)𝑅 − 𝛽(𝑛)𝑥𝑤. To make sure that the elasticity of demand 
                                                 
3 One illustration of this tradeoff between fixed and marginal costs in the choice of technology is as follows. The 
adoption of containers is an important innovation in the transportation sector in the twentieth century. Before the 
introduction of containers, the loading and unloading of cargos were handled by longshoremen and were labor 
intensive. Compared with loading and unloading by longshoremen, containerization is a technology with a higher 
fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production.  
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for capital for a manufacturing firm is constant (see footnote 6 for the derivation of this elasticity), 
capital and labor requirements are specified as4 
    𝑓(𝑛) = 𝜓𝑛ఏ,           (8a) 
    𝛽(𝑛) = 𝑔𝑛ି௛.           (8b) 
A manufacturing firm takes the wage rate, the cost of capital, and other manufacturing 
firms’ output as given and chooses its technology and output to maximize its profit. The first order 
condition for a manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of technology is 
   −𝑓ᇱ(𝑛)𝑅 − 𝛽ᇱ(𝑛)𝑥𝑤 = 0.            (9) 
The first order condition for a manufacturing firm’s optimal choice of output is 𝑝 + 𝑥 డ௣
డ௫
=
𝛽(𝑛)𝑤. In a Cournot competition, a firm takes other firms’ output as given when choosing its 
output. As a result, డ௫
డ௣
= 𝐿 డ௖
డ௣
= ௅௖
௣
డ௖
డ௣
௣
௖
. Since the absolute value of a consumer’s elasticity of 
demand for a manufactured good is one, ௫
௣
డ௣
డ௫
= − ଵ
௠
. Thus, a manufacturing firm’s optimal choice 
of output yields 
     𝑝 ቀ1 − ଵ
௠
ቁ = 𝛽𝑤.          (10) 
 The number of manufacturing firms is determined by the zero-profit condition.5 Zero profit 
for a manufacturing firm requires that 
     𝑝𝑥 − 𝑓𝑅 − 𝛽𝑥𝑤 = 0.          (11) 
The number of banks serving manufacturing firms producing manufactured good 𝜛 is 
𝑚௕(𝜛). The interest rate a bank pays to a depositor is 𝑟. The fixed cost of operating a bank is 𝑓௕ 
units of capital.6 With the amount of deposits 𝑥௕ , a bank’s profit is 𝑅𝑥௕ − 𝑓௕𝑟 − 𝑟𝑥௕ . Banks 
engage in Cournot competition. A bank takes the interest rate paid to depositors as given and 
                                                 
4 The specifications in equations (8a) and (8b) to ensure a constant elasticity of demand for capital for a manufacturing 
firm plays a role similar to the specification of the utility function in equation (1) which ensures a constant elasticity 
of demand for manufactured goods. Thus, for this two-tier oligopoly, both stages exhibit constant elasticity of demand. 
5 See Sections 3.7 and 4.5 of Brander (1995), Zhang (2007), and Liu and Wang (2010) for examples of Cournot 
competition with free entry. 
6 Without increasing returns in the intermediation of financial services, financial intermediation is not needed, and a 
manufacturing firm may contact individuals directly for capital. There are various sources leading to increasing returns 
in the financial sector. First, banks engage in monitoring, which is a fixed cost. Second, banks rely on computer 
systems extensively (Pilloff, 2005, p. 145). Third, advertising is another source of increasing returns.  
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chooses its amount of deposits to maximize its profit. A bank’s optimal choice of the amount of 
deposits yields7 
     𝑅 ቀ1 − ఏା௛
ఏ௠್
ቁ = 𝑟.          (12) 
 There is free entry and exit in the banking sector. Zero profit for a bank requires that 
     𝑅𝑥௕ − 𝑓௕𝑟 − 𝑟𝑥௕ = 0.         (13) 
 
2.3 Market clearing conditions 
We now establish various market-clearing conditions. For manufactured good 𝜛 , the 
amount of capital supplied by banks 𝑚௕𝑥௕  should be equal to the amount of capital used by 
manufacturing firms 𝑚𝑓:  
     𝑚௕𝑥௕ = 𝑚𝑓.           (14) 
For the market for capital, demand is the sum of demand from the banking sector 
∫ 𝑚௕(𝜛)𝑓௕(𝜛)𝑑𝜛
ଵ
଴  and manufacturing sector ∫ 𝑚(𝜛)𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛
ଵ
଴ . Thus, total demand is 
∫ 𝑚௕(𝜛)𝑓௕(𝜛)𝑑𝜛
ଵ
଴ + ∫ 𝑚(𝜛)𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛
ଵ
଴ . Total supply of capital is 𝐾 . The clearance of the 
market for capital requires 
    ∫ 𝑚௕(𝜛)𝑓௕(𝜛)𝑑𝜛
ଵ
଴ + ∫ 𝑚(𝜛)𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = 𝐾
ଵ
଴ .       (15) 
For manufactured good  , each firm demands 𝛽𝑥 units of labor and demand for labor 
from 𝑚 firms is 𝑚(𝜛)𝛽(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛). Integrating over all manufactured goods, with unemployment 
rate 𝑢(𝜛) , total amount of labor in the manufacturing sector is ∫ ௠
(ధ)ఉ(ధ)௫(ధ)
ଵି௨(ధ)
𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ . 
Unemployment rate in the agricultural sector is the same as that in the manufacturing sector and 
total amount of labor in the agricultural sector is 𝐿௔/(1 − 𝑢). The total supply of labor is 𝐿. 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that 
    ∫ ௠
(ధ)ఉ(ధ)௫(ధ)
ଵି௨(ధ)
𝑑𝜛 + ௅ೌ
ଵି௨
= 𝐿ଵ଴ .         (16) 
Total income of the home country is (1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 + 𝑢𝑧𝐿 + 𝜂𝐿 and α per cent of total income 
is spent on the agricultural good, thus demand for the agricultural good is 𝛼[(1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 + 𝑢𝑧𝐿 +
                                                 
7 For the derivation of equation (12), plugging equations (8a) and (8b) into equation (9) leads to 𝑛 = ቀ௚௛௫௪
ఏటோ
ቁ
ഇ
ഇశ೓. Thus, 
ௗ௙
ௗோ
ோ
௙
= 𝑓ᇱ ௗ௡
ௗோ
ோ
௙
= − ఏ
ఏା௛
. 
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𝜂𝐿] . Value of supply of the agricultural good is 𝑝௔𝐿௔ . The clearance of the market for the 
agricultural good requires 
   𝛼[(1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 + 𝑢𝑧𝐿 + 𝜂𝐿] = 𝑝௔𝐿௔.         (17) 
Since 1 − 𝛼  per cent of total income is spent on manufactured goods, demand for 
manufactured goods is (1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 + 𝑢𝑧𝐿 + 𝜂𝐿]. The value of supply of manufactured 
goods is ∫ 𝑝(𝜛)𝑚(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ . The clearance of the market for manufactured goods requires 
   (1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 + 𝑢𝑧𝐿 + 𝜂𝐿] = ∫ 𝑝(𝜛)𝑚(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ .      (18) 
 The return for an individual in the manufacturing sector is 𝑤 . Since each individual 
produces one unit of the agricultural good, the return for an individual employed in the agricultural 
sector is 𝑝௔. Individuals in the two sectors face the same unemployment rate. For an individual to 
be indifferent between the agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector, the returns in the two 
sectors should be equal: 
     𝑤 = 𝑝௔.            (19) 
In equilibrium, the total amount of revenue received by individuals as owners of capital 𝜂𝐿 
should be equal to the sum of capital income 𝑟𝐾: 
     𝜂𝐿 = 𝑟𝐾.           (20) 
 In a closed economy, equations (7) and (9)-(20) form a system of thirteen equations 
defining thirteen variables 𝐿௔ , 𝑤 , 𝑢 ,  , 𝑝௔ , 𝑟 , 𝑚 , 𝑚௕ , 𝑝 , 𝑅 , 𝑥 , 𝑛 , and 𝑥௕  as functions of 
exogenous parameters. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of producing 
firms, output of a firm, the price, and consumption are the same for all manufactured goods. Since 
the measure of manufactured goods is one, for simplicity we drop the integration operator in a 
symmetric equilibrium. A symmetric equilibrium in a closed economy is a tuple (𝐿௔, 𝑤, 𝑢,  , 𝑝௔, 
𝑟 , 𝑚 , 𝑚௕ , 𝑝 , 𝑅 , 𝑥 , 𝑛 , 𝑥௕ ) satisfying equations (7) and (9)-(20). For the rest of the paper, a 
representative manufactured good is used as the numeraire: 𝑝 ≡ 1. 
 
2.4. Comparative statics 
 To explore properties of the equilibrium, we conduct some manipulations. Plugging the 
value of 𝑚𝑓  from equation (14) into equation (15), using equation (12) to eliminate 𝑚௕  and 
equation (13) to eliminate 𝑥௕ from the resulting equation yields the following relationship between 
the interest rate paid to depositors and the interest rate charged by banks: 
10 
 
    𝑟 = 𝑅 ቆ1 − ට(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ௄
ቇ.          (21) 
 Plugging (21) into (12) and (13), we get 𝑚௕ = ට
(ఏା௛)௄
ఏ௙್
 and 𝑥௕ = ට
ఏ௄௙್
ఏା௛
− 𝑓௕. Plugging 
those results into equation (14), the number of manufacturing firms is 
     𝑚 =
௄ିටഇశ೓ഇ ௄௙್
௙
.           (22) 
 The system of equations (7) and (10)-(20) defining the equilibrium in a closed economy is 
reduced to the following system of three equations defining three variables 𝑤 , 𝑢 , and 𝑛  as 
functions of exogenous parameters:8 
   𝛤ଵ ≡ 𝛼ఈ(1 − 𝛼)ଵିఈ𝑤ଵିఈ − 𝜙 −
థ
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0,      (23a) 
   𝛤ଶ ≡ ቆ1 − ට
(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ௄
ቇ 𝐾 − ௙
ଵିఉ௪
= 0,        (23b) 
   𝛤ଷ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ(1 − 𝛽𝑤) − 𝛽′𝑓𝑤 = 0.      (23c) 
 Partial differentiation of equations (23a)-(23c) with respect to 𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑛, 𝐾, 𝑏, and 𝑓௕ yields 
  
⎝
⎜
⎛
 
  డ௰భ
డ௪
     డ௰భ
డ௨
     0 
డ௰మ
డ௪ 
      0       0
   డ௰య
డ௪ 
      0     డ௰య
డ௡ ⎠
⎟
⎞
൭
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑛
൱ = − ቌ
0
డ௰మ
డ௄
0
ቍ 𝑑𝐾 − ቌ
డ௰భ
డ௕
0
0
ቍ 𝑑𝑏 − ቌ
0
డ௰మ
డ௙್
0
ቍ  𝑑𝑓௕ .           (24) 
 Partial differentiation of equations (23a) and (23b) reveals that డ௰భ
డ௨
> 0, డ௰మ
డ௪
< 0 and డ௰య
డ௡ 
<
0. Thus, the determinant of the matrix of the coefficients of endogenous variables of (24) is 
negative: 𝛥 ≡ − డ௰భ
డ௨
డ௰మ
డ௪
డ௰య
డ௡ 
< 0. With 𝛥 nonsingular, a unique equilibrium exists.  
The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the amount of capital on the 
unemployment rate and the wage rate. 
 
 Proposition 1: An increase in the amount of capital causes the unemployment rate to 
decrease, the equilibrium wage rate to increase, and the level of technology to increase. 
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (24) yields ௗ௪
ௗ௄
> 0, ௗ௨
ௗ௄
< 0, and ௗ௡
ௗ௄
> 0. ■ 
                                                 
8 Equations (23a)-(23c) are derived as follows. First, equation (23a) results from plugging the value of 𝑝௔  from 
equation (19) into equation (7). Second, equation (23b) comes from plugging the value of 𝑚 from equation (22) into 
equation (10). Third, equation (23c) is derived by plugging the value of 𝑥 from equation (11) into equation (9). 
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When the amount of capital increases, 
both the number of banks and the level of output of a bank increase. To absorb an increased supply 
of capital to the manufacturing sector, either the number of manufacturing firms or the level of 
technology or both will increase. First, if the number of manufacturing firms increases, this 
increased degree of competition among firms trying to hire workers will cause the wage rate to 
increase. A higher wage rate increases a manufacturing firm’s incentive to adopt more advanced 
technologies because the marginal benefit from adopting a more advanced technology increases 
with the wage rate. Second, if the number of firms does not change and firms adopt more advanced 
technologies, a more advanced technology will reduce the marginal cost of production. Through 
equation (10), marginal revenue would not change if the number of manufacturing firms does not 
change. To make sure that marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the wage rate needs to increase. 
Thus, both the wage rate and the level of technology will always increase with the amount of 
capital. Through the non-shirking condition, a higher wage rate is associated with a lower 
unemployment rate.  
 One parameter measuring the degree of efficiency in the labor market is the exogenous job 
separation rate. A higher job separation rate may be interpreted as a less efficient labor market. 
The following proposition studies the impact of a change in the exogenous job separation rate.9 
 
 Proposition 2: An increase in the exogenous job separation rate increases the 
unemployment rate and changes neither the wage rate nor the level of technology. 
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (24) yields ௗ௨
ௗ௕
> 0, ௗ௪
ௗ௕
= 0, and ௗ௡
ௗ௕
= 0. ■ 
 
 To understand Proposition 2, equations (23b) and (23c) form a system of two equations 
defining the level of technology and the wage rate as functions of exogenous parameters. Since 
the exogenous job separation rate does not show up in those equations, wage rate and technology 
are not affected by the exogenous job separation rate. When the exogenous job separation rate 
increases, from equation (23a), the unemployment rate increases so that the non-shirking constraint 
is maintained.  
                                                 
9 Impact of an increase in the cost of exerting effort is similar to that of an increase in the exogenous job separation 
rate. 
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 A higher fixed cost in the financial sector indicates a less efficient financial sector. The 
following propositions studies the impact of a change in the level of efficiency in the financial 
sector. 
 
 Proposition 3: A country with a more efficient financial sector has a higher wage rate, a 
lower unemployment rate, and a more advanced technology. 
Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule on (24) yields ௗ௪
ௗ௙್
< 0, ௗ௨
ௗ௙್
> 0, and ௗ௡
ௗ௙್
< 0. ∎ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. A more efficient financial sector uses less 
capital, and the released capital can be used by manufacturing firms. A higher number of 
manufacturing firms leads to a higher wage rate and a lower unemployment rate. A higher wage 
rate increases the marginal benefit of adopting a more advanced technology and equilibrium level 
of technology increases. Poor institutions such as the existence of red tapes can increase the level 
of fixed costs in the financial sector significantly. Thus Proposition 3 is consistent with empirical 
studies such as Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011) that quality of institutions affects a 
country’s gain from openness. 
 A country’s comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods is measured by the 
relative price of manufactured goods to the agricultural good. With the price of manufactured 
goods normalized to one in this model, a country’s comparative advantage can be measured by the 
price of the agricultural good: the higher the price of the agricultural good, the higher a country’s 
comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods. Since the price of the agricultural good 
is equal to the wage rate, from Propositions 1 and 3, a country with a higher amount of capital or 
a more efficient financial sector has a comparative advantage in producing manufactured goods. 
Interestingly, from the system of equations (23a)-(23c), a country’s comparative advantage is not 
affected by population size or the level of efficiency in the labor market. 
 
3. Trade integration 
 In this section, we study the impact of trade integration. With the opening of international 
trade, markets for manufactured goods in the two countries are integrated while the banking sectors 
are not. Consumers in the foreign country are assumed to have the same preference as domestic 
consumers. The foreign country is assumed to have the same level of efficiency in the labor market 
13 
 
and the same technology in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. However, the foreign 
country may have different capital and labor endowments. The two countries may also differ in 
their level of efficiency in the financial sector. Variables associated with the foreign country carry 
an asterisk mark. 
With trade integration, a manufacturing firm competes with both domestic and foreign 
firms producing the same good. Like the derivation of equation (10), a domestic manufacturing 
firm’s optimal choice of output yields 
    𝑝 ቀ1 − ௫
௠௫ା௠∗௫∗
ቁ = 𝛽𝑤.          (25) 
 Similarly, a foreign firm’s optimal choice of output yields 
    𝑝 ቀ1 − ௫∗
௠௫ା௠∗௫∗
ቁ = 𝛽𝑤∗.        (25*) 
 Like the equilibrium conditions for the home country, the following conditions hold for the 
foreign country: 
    ఈ
ഀ(ଵିఈ)భషഀ
௣ೌഀ
𝑤∗ − 𝜙 − థ
௤
ቀ ௕
௨∗
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0,        (7*) 
    −𝑓ᇱ(𝑛∗)𝑅∗ − 𝛽ᇱ(𝑛∗)𝑥∗𝑤∗ = 0.         (9*) 
    𝑝𝑥∗ − 𝑓𝑅∗ − 𝛽𝑥∗𝑤∗ = 0,         (11*) 
    𝑅∗ ൬1 − ఏା௛
ఏ௠್
∗ ൰ = 𝑟∗,         (12*) 
    𝑅∗𝑥௕∗ − 𝑓௕∗𝑟∗ − 𝑟∗𝑥௕∗ = 0,        (13*) 
    𝑚௕∗ 𝑥௕∗ = 𝑚∗𝑓,          (14*) 
    ∫ 𝑚௕∗ (𝜛)𝑓௕∗(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 + ∫ 𝑚∗(𝜛)
ଵ
଴
ଵ
଴ 𝑓(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = 𝐾
∗,     (15*) 
    ∫ ௠
∗(ధ)ఉ(ధ)௫∗(ధ)ା௅ೌ∗
ଵି௨∗(ధ)
𝑑𝜛 = 𝐿∗ଵ଴ .       (16*) 
    𝑤∗ = 𝑝௔,           (19*) 
    𝜂∗𝐿∗ = 𝑟∗𝐾∗.          (20*) 
Like equation (17), the clearance of the world market for the agricultural good under trade 
integration requires 
 𝛼[(1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 + 𝑤∗𝐿∗) + 𝑧(𝑢𝐿 + 𝑢∗𝐿∗) + 𝜂𝐿 + 𝜂∗𝐿∗]  = 𝑝௔(𝐿௔ + 𝐿௔ ∗).      (26) 
Like equation (18), the clearance of the world market for manufactured goods under trade 
integration requires  
(1 − 𝛼)[(1 − 𝑢)(𝑤𝐿 + 𝑤∗𝐿∗) + 𝑧(𝑢𝐿 + 𝑢∗𝐿∗) + 𝜂𝐿 + 𝜂∗𝐿∗] 
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= ∫ 𝑝(𝜛)[𝑚(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛) + 𝑚∗(𝜛)𝑥∗(𝜛ଵ଴ )]𝑑𝜛.    (27) 
With trade integration, equations (7), (7*), (9), (9*), (11)-(16), (11*)-(16*), (19)-(20), 
(19*)-(20*), (25), (25*), and (26)-(27) form a system of 24 equations defining 24 endogenous 
variables 𝑤, 𝑤∗, 𝑢, 𝑢∗,  , 𝜂∗, 𝑝௔ , 𝑟, 𝑟∗, 𝑚, 𝑚∗, 𝑚௕ , 𝑚௕∗ , 𝑝, 𝑅, 𝑅∗, 𝑥, 𝑥∗, 𝐿௔ , 𝐿௔∗ , 𝑛, 𝑛∗, 𝑥௕  and 
𝑥௕∗  as functions of exogenous parameters. From (19) and (19*), since there is no transportation cost 
for the agricultural good and the two countries have the same production technology in the 
agricultural sector, wage rate in the two countries will be equal: 𝑤 = 𝑤∗. From (19), (19*), (25), 
and (25*), domestic and foreign firms in the manufacturing sector will have the same level of 
output with a trade integration: 𝑥 = 𝑥∗. From (7), (7*), (19), and (19*), the two countries will have 
the same unemployment rate with a trade integration: 𝑢 = 𝑢∗. 
 With trade integration, it can be shown that the two countries pay different interest rates to 
depositors even though banks charge the same interest rate to manufacturing firms. From equation 
(21), interest rate paid to depositors increases with the level of efficiency in the financial sector. 
Thus, the country with a more efficient financial sector pays a higher interest rate to depositors. 
Like the derivation of equations (23a)-(23c), the system of equations defining the 
equilibrium with trade integration can be reduced to the following system of three equations 
defining three variables 𝑤, 𝑢, and 𝑛 as functions of exogenous parameters: 
   𝛷ଵ ≡ 𝛼ఈ(1 − 𝛼)ଵିఈ𝑤ଵିఈ − 𝜙 −
థ
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0,      (28a) 
   𝛷ଶ ≡ ቆ1 − ට
௙್
௄
ቇ 𝐾 + ቆ1 − ට௙್∗
௄∗
ቇ 𝐾∗ − ௙
ଵିఉ௪
= 0,      (28b) 
   𝛷ଷ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ(1 − 𝛽𝑤) − 𝛽′𝑓𝑤 = 0.                   (28c) 
 Partial differentiation of equations (28a)-(28c) with respect to 𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑛, and 𝐾∗ yields 
    
⎝
⎜
⎛
 
డఃభ
డ௪
     డఃభ
డ௨
    0
డఃమ
డ௪ 
      0        0
  డఃయ
డ௪ 
      0     డఃయ
డ௡ ⎠
⎟
⎞
൭
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑛
൱ = ቌ
0
− డఃమ
డ௄∗
0
ቍ 𝑑𝐾∗ .       (29) 
 The determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (29) is negative: 
𝛥ః ≡ −
డఃభ
డ௨
డఃమ
డ௪
డఃయ
డ௡ 
< 0. With 𝛥ః nonsingular, a unique equilibrium exists.  
The following proposition studies the impact of trade integration on the unemployment 
rate, wage rate, and level of technology. 
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Proposition 4: Trade integration decreases the unemployment rate, increases the wage rate 
and the level of technology. 
 Proof: A comparison of (23a)-(23c) with (28a)-(28c) reveals that the impact of trade 
integration can be captured by a change of 𝐾∗ from zero to a positive number. Applying Cramer’s 
rule on (29) yields ௗ௨
ௗ௄∗
< 0, ௗ௪
ௗ௄∗
> 0, and ௗ௡
ௗ௄∗
> 0. ■ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. Trade integration increases the degree of 
competition in the manufacturing sector. Since the price of a manufactured good as a markup over 
marginal cost decreases, manufacturing firms produce more. This increase in the demand for 
workers causes the wage rate to increase and the unemployment rate to decrease. Proposition 4 is 
consistent with empirical evidence such as Alcala and Ciccone (2004) showing that trade openness 
increase productivity. 
Since firms earn zero profits, social welfare can be measured by consumer welfare. With 
the wage rate increases at the same magnitude as the price of the agricultural good and the price 
of manufactured goods does not change, consumer welfare increases. Consumer welfare also 
increases because a lower unemployment rate means expected length of unemployment is lower. 
Overall, with trade integration, social welfare in both countries increases. 
 From (29), a more efficient financial sector in any of the two countries will increase wage 
rate and reduce unemployment rate in both countries. Thus, an increase in the level of efficiency 
in the financial sector in one country will benefit both countries. 
 
4. Financial and trade integration 
 In this section, in addition to trade integration, countries also have financial integration. 
With financial integration, the two countries have the same level of interest rate paid to depositors 
and the same interest rate charged by banks. When countries have both trade and financial 
integration, we call it a joint integration. In this section, we assume countries have the same level 
of efficiency in the financial sector. The two countries may still have different endowments of 
labor and capital.  
 With financial integration, the following equations are valid: 
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   𝑅 ൬1 − (ఏା௛)௫್
ఏ(௠್௫್ା௠್
∗ ௫್
∗ )
൰ = 𝑟,           (30) 
   𝑅 ൬1 − ௫್
∗
ఏ(௠್௫್ା௠್
∗ ௫್)
∗ ൰ = 𝑟,         (30*) 
   𝑚௕𝑥௕ + 𝑚௕∗ 𝑥௕∗ = 𝑚𝑓 + 𝑚∗𝑓,           (31) 
   ∫ 𝑚௕𝑓௕𝑑𝜛 + ∫ 𝑚𝑓𝑑𝜛 +
ଵ
଴
ଵ
଴ ∫ 𝑚௕
∗ 𝑓௕∗𝑑𝜛 + ∫ 𝑚∗
ଵ
଴
ଵ
଴ 𝑓𝑑𝜛 = 𝐾 + 𝐾
∗.        (32) 
 Explanations of equations (30), (30*), (31), and (32) are as follows. First, equation (30) 
comes from a domestic bank’s optimal choice of the amount of deposits. Second, equation (30*) 
comes from a foreign bank’s optimal choice of the amount of deposits. Third, equation (31) states 
that the total amount of deposits in the banks for the world as a whole 𝑚௕𝑥௕ + 𝑚௕∗ 𝑥௕∗   is equal to 
the total amount of capital in the manufacturing sector 𝑚𝑓 + 𝑚∗𝑓. Finally, equation (32) states 
that world demand for capital ∫ 𝑚௕𝑓௕𝑑𝜛 + ∫ 𝑚𝑓𝑑𝜛 +
ଵ
଴
ଵ
଴ ∫ 𝑚௕
∗ 𝑓௕∗𝑑𝜛 + ∫ 𝑚∗
ଵ
଴
ଵ
଴ 𝑓𝑑𝜛 equals world 
supply of capital 𝐾 + 𝐾∗. 
Equations (7), (7*), (9), (9*), (11), (11*), (13), (13*), (16), (16*), (19), (19*), (20), (20*), 
(25), (25*), (26), (27), (30), (30*), (31), and (32) form a system of 22 equations defining 22 
endogenous variables 𝑤, 𝑤∗, 𝑢, 𝑢∗,  , 𝜂∗, 𝑝௔, 𝑟, 𝑚, 𝑚∗, 𝑚௕, 𝑚௕∗ , 𝑝, 𝑅, 𝑥, 𝑥∗, 𝐿௔ , 𝐿௔∗ , 𝑛, 𝑛∗, 𝑥௕, 
and 𝑥௕∗  as functions of exogenous parameters.  
Like the derivation of (21) and (22), under joint integration we have 
   𝑟 = 𝑅 ൬1 − ට(ఏା௛)௙್ఏ(௄ା௄∗)൰,          (33) 
   𝑚 + 𝑚∗ =
௄ା௄∗ିටഇశ೓ഇ (௄ା௄
∗)௙್
௙
.          (34) 
With a joint integration, the two countries will have the same unemployment rate. Like the 
derivation of equations (23a)-(23c), the system of equations defining the equilibrium with joint 
integration can be reduced to the following system of three equations defining three variables 𝑤, 
𝑢, and 𝑛 as functions of exogenous parameters: 
   𝛺ଵ ≡ 𝛼ఈ(1 − 𝛼)ଵିఈ𝑤ଵିఈ − 𝜙 −
థ
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0,      (35a) 
   𝛺ଶ = ൬1 − ට
(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ(௄ା௄∗)
൰ (𝐾 + 𝐾∗) − ௙
ଵିఉ௪
= 0,      (35b) 
   𝛺ଷ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ(1 − 𝛽𝑤) − 𝛽′𝑓𝑤 = 0.                   (35c) 
 Partial differentiation of equations (35a)-(35c) with respect to 𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑛, and 𝐾∗ yields 
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⎝
⎜
⎛
 
డఆభ
డ௪
     డఆభ
డ௨
    0 
డఆమ
డ௪ 
       0      0
డఆయ
డ௪ 
      0     డఆయ
డ௡ 
 ⎠
⎟
⎞
൭
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑛
൱ = − ቌ
0
డఆమ
డ௄∗
0
ቍ 𝑑𝐾∗ .       (36) 
 The determinant of the coefficient matrix of endogenous variables of (36) is negative: 
𝛥ఆ ≡
డఆభ
డ௨
డఆమ
డ௪
డఆయ
డ௡ 
> 0. With 𝛥ఆ nonsingular, a unique equilibrium exists.  
The following proposition compares the equilibrium with a joint integration with the 
autarky equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 5: Compared with autarky, a joint integration increases the wage rate and the 
level of technology and reduces the unemployment rate. 
Proof: A comparison of (23a)-(23b) with (35a)-(35b) reveals that a joint financial and trade 
integration can be captured by a change of 𝐾∗ from zero to a positive number. Applying Cramer’s 
rule on (36) yields ௗ௨
ௗ௄∗
< 0, ௗ௡
ௗ௄∗
> 0, and ௗ௪
ௗ௄∗
> 0. ■ 
 
To understand Proposition 5, financial integration increases the degree of competition in 
the financial sector. While the total number of banks in the world will not be smaller than the 
number of banks in either country before financial integration, some banks in each country will 
exit after financial integration. This exit releases capital for the manufacturing sector. Trade 
integration increases the degree of competition in the manufacturing sector. Both kinds of 
integration cause the wage rate to increase and the unemployment rate to decrease. 
The following proposition studies the impact of a financial integration after a trade 
integration. 
 
Proposition 6: Starting from a trade integration, a further financial integration increases the 
wage rate and decreases the unemployment rate. 
Proof: When the two countries have the same level of efficiency in the financial sector, 
equation (28b) becomes 
   ቆ1 − ට(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ௄
ቇ 𝐾 + ቆ1 − ට(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ௄∗
ቇ 𝐾∗ = ௙
ଵିఉ௪
.       (37) 
Equation (35b) can be rearranged as 
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   ൬1 − ට(ఏା௛)௙್ఏ(௄ା௄∗)൰ 𝐾 + ൬1 − ට
(ఏା௛)௙್
ఏ(௄ା௄∗)
൰ 𝐾∗ = ௙
ଵିఉ௪
.       (38) 
For equations (37) and (38), the wage rate increases when the left-hand side increases. A 
comparison of equation (37) with (38) reveals that the wage rate defined in (38) is higher than that 
defined in (37). Thus, the unemployment rate defined by equation (35a) is lower than that defined 
by equation (28a). ∎ 
 
To understand Proposition 6, with financial integration, in each country some banks will 
exit. The released capital can be used by manufacturing firms in each country. This causes the 
wage rate to increase and unemployment rate to fall. Proposition 6 is consistent with empirical 
research such as Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011) showing that financial openness increase 
productivity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The level of unemployment could be affected by firms’ choice of technologies, and 
technology choices in a country could be affected by the level of efficiency in the financial sector. 
With the opening of international trade, will a country with a less efficient financial sector have a 
higher unemployment rate than a country with a more efficient financial sector? With oligopoly as 
an important type of market structure in a modern society, it will be interesting to address those 
questions in a model in which firms engage in Cournot competition. In this paper, we have studied 
the impact of economic integration on unemployment in a general equilibrium model in which 
banks and manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and unemployment is the result 
of the existence of efficiency wages. In a closed economy, we have shown that an increase in the 
amount of capital causes the unemployment rate to decrease and the level of technology to 
increase. An increase in the exogenous job separation rate increases the unemployment rate and 
changes neither the wage rate nor the level of technology. A country with a higher amount of 
capital or a more efficient financial sector has a comparative advantage in producing manufactured 
goods. Trade or financial integration can cause the unemployment rate to decrease and the wage 
rate to increase in both countries.  
 There are some interesting generalizations and extensions of the model. First, for 
simplicity, we have assumed land is not a factor of production in the agricultural sector and 
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unemployment rate in this sector is the same as that in the manufacturing sector. It will be 
interesting to study a model relaxing those assumptions. Second, various countries experienced 
financial crises during previous decades and the benefit of financial integration has been debated. 
It will be interesting to incorporate the possibility of financial crises into the current model. Third, 
impact of economic integration on a country’s welfare is frequently affected by a country’s 
technological capacity. A country will be more likely to benefit from economic integration if it has 
strong technological capacity. In this model, new technologies are always available. It will be 
valuable to incorporate endogenous development of technologies into the model. Finally, in this 
model there is no unemployment benefit. The model can be generalized to the case that the 
government imposes a lump-sum tax to finance unemployment income. This generalization will 
be useful to address issues such as the sectorial optimal taxation or labor versus capital taxation. 
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